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CONTRACTS OF INDEMNITY AND THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS
A RULE of law is a statement of uniformity of behavior,
whether of planets or atoms or men- a statement by which
their future behavior can be predicted with reasonable assurance.
Many such statements turn out to be inaccurate or even wholly
worthless, for predictions do not always come true. If the stated
rule is part of the common law, it purports to represent past expe-
rience, and is based upon a uniformity of action by judicial and
executive officers of the state. It enables one to predict like ac-
tion in the future by such officers. That such predictions have
some measure of accuracy is witnessed by the fact that a large
legal profession can make a living, not only as advocates in a liti-
gation but also as advisory counsel to prevent litigation and to lay
such a foundation that future litigation will be successful. If the
stated rule is statutory law, it purports to direct human behavior
for the future, and again enables one to predict the action of judi-
cial and executive officers. These predictions also have a certain
amount of accuracy, an amount that should increase as the statute
grows older and its effect upon judicial and executive action be-
comes a part of experience.
In the case of the common law rules new and disturbing ele-
ments continually appear, turning old rules that once were a
sound basis of prediction into empty and lifeless formulas or
worse. Ordinarily the change occurs slowly; and acute lawyers
who know the life around them as well as mere verbal formulas
can take the changes into account in making their advisory
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predictions for clients. Statutory rules in the beginning usually
create an illusion of certainty; with experience the illusion van-
ishes. Safe prediction as to the exact operation of the statute must
await actual experience in its application. It is always true that
along the boundaries of its application the statutory rule varies
and is recreated exactly the same as a common law rule, and for
the very same reasons. This is not judicial usurpation; it is
merely inevitable necessity.'
The Statute of Frauds has now been a part of the law of the
land for one quarter of a millenium. It has been interpreted and
applied by the courts in tens of thousands of cases. Surely there
have been experience and time enough to create uniformity and
to make prediction a pleasure. It is safer, however, merely to say
that they have sufficed to destroy the illusion. The legislative
words usually are, "No action shall be brought whereby to
charge. . . ." If this was meant to prevent the "bringing" of
actions, how great the disappointment! The bulky contents of
the reports and the digests suggest that an action has in fact been
brought in almost every instance where a " special promise" of
the prescribed classes has been made and has not been performed,
as well as in great numbers of cases where the alleged promise has
not been made at all. In the latter cases the statute may have
1 In Hanau v. Ehrlich, [11ii] 2 K. B. io56, io69, Buckley, L. J., said: "1 It is
now two centuries too late to ascertain the meaning of s. 4 by applying one's own
mind independently to the interpretation of its language. Our task is a much more
humble one; it is to see how that section has been expounded in decisions and how
the decisions apply to the present case." No doubt the same could be said of almost
any written constitution or statute, but usually with a lesser degree of truth.
In Reeve v. Jennings, [1910] 2 K. B. 522, 529, Coleridge, L. J., said: "The
Statute of Frauds has been much buffeted about by decisions, but its life is not quite
extinct." In the case before him he held that the statute made the promise unen-
forceable.
Smirra, CONTRACTS (1847) 32, commenting upon Lord Nottingham's statement
that every line of the statute was worth a subsidy, observes: " Every line has cost
a subsidy, for it is universally admitted that no enactment of any Legislature ever
became the subject of so much litigation."
"This provision comes to us from the original statute of frauds, 29 Car. II, of
which it has been said by an enthusiast that every line was worth a subsidy, and by
a cynic that every line has cost a subsidy to interpret. The latter statement has
been gaining force as the ingenuity of greed has, through centuries, been strained to
escape this apparently plain provision, until its application is now surrounded by
such a cloud of decisions as to defy exhaustive examination." McCord v. Edward
Hines Lumber Co., 124 Wis. 509, 5IO, 102 N. W. 334, 335 (19o5).
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CONTRACTS OF INDEMNITY AND STATUTE OF FRAUDS 691
been an added safeguard for the innocent against the dishonest;
in the former cases it offers a possible refuge for contract break-
ers. If the statute was meant as a basis for predicting the be-
havior of plaintiffs and their lawyers, the best that we can say of
the legislature is that it "meant well." Of course, it is possible
to assert that but for the statute many more cases would have
been brought, especially fraudulent ones; no one can prove what
would have been had there been no statute. It is at least as cer-
tain that but for the statute there would have been fewer broken
promises and less litigation.2
If the legislature meant to lay a basis not for predicting the be-
havior of plaintiffs but for predicting the behavior of judges when
actions are brought on the special promises described in the
statute, the disappointment is also very great. There is much
conflict and lack of uniformity. Two conflicting tendencies have
been evident for the whole two hundred and fifty years. One of
these is to regard the statute as a great and noble preventive of
fraud and to apply it against the plaintiff with a good conscience
even in cases where no doubt exists that the defendant made the
promise with which he is charged.' The other and much more
frequent one is to enforce promises that a jury would find to have
2 "He rests his defence on the statute of frauds, which probably generates as
many frauds as it prevents." Lamborn v. Watson, 6 Har. & 3. 252, 255 (Md. 2824).
"The whole argument is grounded on the interpretation of the Statute of Frauds,
that unfortunate statute, the misguided application of which has been the cause of
so many frauds. Like any other statute, it is to be read with common sense and
understanding." Bacon, V. C., in Morgan v. Worthington, 38 L. T. (N. s.) 443,
445 (1878).
3 As might be expected, Lord Kenyon was all for a strict application. In
Chater v. Beckett, 7 T. R. 201, 204 (1797), he said: "I lament extremely that ex-
ceptions were ever introduced in construing the statute of Frauds; it is a very
beneficial statute and if the Courts had at first abided by the strict letter of the
act it would have prevented a multitude of suits that have since been brought."
In Woollam v. Hearn, 7 Ves. 211, 218 (1802), Sir William Grant said: "Thinking,
as I do, that the Statute has been already too much broken in upon by supposed
equitable exceptions, I shall not go farther in receiving and giving effect to parol
evidence, than I am forced by precedent." But more than a century later, the Privy
Council held in direct conflict with his decision and did not even mention the case.
United States v. Motor Trucks, Ltd., [1924] A. C. 196.
In Dunphy v. Ryan, 116 U. S. 491, 498 (1886), Woods, J., said: "The statute
of frauds is founded in wisdom and has been justified by long experience." But
he added: " Courts of equity, to prevent the statute from becoming an instrument
of fraud, have in many instances relaxed its provisions.!
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
been in fact made, and if necessary to this end to narrow the oper-
ation of the statute.4 This narrowing of application was some-
times accompanied by general words of encomium for the great
statute; but in recent years the courts nearly always say nothing
on the subject except what may be necessary to the business ac-
tually in hand, the enforcement of the promise. The narrowing
process has been in part one of supposed interpretation of lan-
guage and in part one of permitting the jury to determine the ap-
plication of the statute by a general verdict under instructions
that do not in fact hamper the jury in its effort to do "justice." '
The statutory clause forbidding an action on a promise that "is
4 In many cases the courts have worked indefatigably to prevent a defendant
from using the statute to defeat the enforcement of his promise. In Bader v.
Hiscox, 188 Iowa 986, 74 N. W. 565 (1919), the plaintiff had been seduced by the
defendant's son and had brought civil and criminal proceedings. The defendant
promised to convey land to the plaintiff if she would marry the son and dismiss the
proceedings. The plaintiff fully performed her part, and the court enforced the
defendant's oral promise. To do this, the court avoided the marriage clause by
holding that marriage was not the consideration because it was not the "end to be
attained" but was a mere necessary "incident"; it avoided the land clause by
holding that full performance of the consideration by the plaintiff took the case
out of the statute; and it avoided the clause dealing with defaults of another by the
bare assertion that "the defendant did not undertake to answer for the debt or
default of his son. . . . The obligation assumed by him was primary and upon
his own credit." This was a most meritorious decision in a case where to apply the
statute would have done grave injustice. The antecedent decisions were such as to
enable the court to hurdle three different clauses of the statute, all three of which
seem applicable to the defendant's promise.
5 The South Carolina judges have shown some interesting changes of attitude
toward the statute. "No statute has been so much, and, in my opinion, so justly
eulogized for its wisdom as the statute of Frauds. This branch of it tends to re-
press evil practices which would otherwise spring up to the insecurity of all. But
for the salutary influence of this statute, thousands would tumble into ruin by
having their estates taken from them to answer for the debts, defaults, and mis-
carriages of others. So far therefore from believing that this branch of the statute
of Frauds has a tendency to produce injustice and wrong, I think it the only
bulwark of security to shield men from those evils which the statute was intended
to remedy." Leland v. Creyon, i McCord ioo, iog (S. C. 1821).
In Hillhouse v. Jennings, 6o S. C. 373, 380, 38 S. E. 599, 6o (igo), the court
said: "Hard cases arise when this provision of our law is applied; but this Court
does not make the law, but it does enforce it in sorrow over its rigor in some
instances." The South Carolina court has avoided some of its sorrow by largely
nullifying the statutory provision affecting promises to answer for the debt of an-
other person. It has sustained a verdict for the plaintiff on the oral promise of a
landlord to guarantee payment of money loaned to his tenant. Farmers Bank v.
Eledge, 126 S. C. 517, 120 S. E. 362 (1923); Gaines v. Durham, 124 S. C. 435, 117
S. E. 732 (1923).
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CONTRACTS OF INDEMNITY AND STATUTE OF FRAUDS 693
not to be performed within the space of one year" has been so
interpreted as not to apply to contracts where either party can
and does perform his own part within one year although the other
cannot,6 or to contracts that can on any remote contingency be
performed within a year but that in fact have been in course of
performance for a great many years before bringing suit.' In
many hundreds of cases a defendant has been held on his oral
promise to answer for the debt of another by instructing the jury
that the defendant is bound if " sole credit" was given to him and
none to the third person.8 Under such an instruction, if the jury
believes that the promise was made and relied upon, a verdict is
rendered for the plaintiff and sustained on appeal. There is more
or less variation in the form of instruction given to the jury.
It is these conflicting tendencies that may be in part responsible
for the conflict that exists in regard to promises of indemnity; but
it is also in part due to differences in definition of the word "in-
demnity" and to mental confusion arising out of the complexity
of legal relations in cases involving at least three parties and often
more than three. The statute itself does not contain the word
"indemnity" ; it does not say " any special promise to indemnify
another." A promise of indemnity is within the statute only in
case it is held to be a promise to answer for the debt or default of
another person. When will it be so held?
In the first place, it is clear that a promise of indemnity is not
within the statute if there is no duty owed by a third person to the
promisee that would be discharged by the performance of the new
promisor, or the performance of which would discharge the new
promisor. Thus, if A says to B: "If you will buy ioo shares of
X stock, I will indemnify you against loss," A's promise is not
within the statute, since there is no third person who owes any-
6 DoneIIan v. Read, 3 B. & Ad. 899 (1832); Diamond v. Jacquith, 14 Ariz. "ig,
125 Pac. 712, L. R. A. 1916D 88o (1912); Bird v. Bilby, 202 Mo. App. 212, 215
S. W. 909 (1919) ; Pierce v. Paine's Estate, 28 Vt. 34 (1855).
7 Warner v. Texas & Pacific R. R., 164 U. S. 418 (1896) (contract enforced
after 13 years); Quirk v. Bank of Commerce, 244 Fed. 682 (C. C. A. 6th, i917)
(service for life) ; Myers v. Saltry, 163 Ky. 481, 173 S. W. 1138 (1915) (to rear and
educate a child).
8 Hammond Coal Co. v. Lewis, 248 Mass. 499, 143 N. E. 309 (X924); Hines
& Smith Co. v. Green, i2i Me. 478, x18 At]. 296 (1922); Myer v. Grafflin, 31 Md.
350 (1869); Simpson v. Penton, 2 Cr. & M. 430 (1834) ; Darnell v. Tratt, 2 C. & P.
82 (1825).
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thing to B, the promisee.9 The same reason applies to promises
to indemnify an officer who seizes goods at the promisor's re-
quest,'" or one who brings or defends a suit in which the promisor
has some interest," or one who is induced to make an entry or a
user -that may turn out to be tortious." A promise to a debtor or
other obligor to pay his debt or save him harmless from his obli-
gation is a promise of indemnity not within the statute."
Secondly, it is equally clear that a promise of indemnity is
within the statute if it is made to a creditor of some third person
and for that person's benefit and accommodation, and if perform-
ance by either the third person or the new promisor will discharge
the duty of the other to the creditor. In such a case the word in-
demnify is being used in exactly the sense of " guarantee" or "be
surety for." Such use of the term is not bad English, although it
ought to be avoided in law. Thus, if S says to C: "Lend money
to P and I will indemnify you against loss," the promise of S is a
promise to answer for P's debt to C and is within the statute.
1 4
9 Kilbride v. Moss, 113 Cal. 432, 45 Pac. 812 (1896); Merchant v. O'Rourke, iii
Iowa 35I, 82 N. W. 759 (i90o); West v. King, 163 Ky. 561, 174 S. W. ii (i9i5);
Green v. Brookins, 23 Mich. 48 (1871); Trenhoim v. Kloepper, 88 Neb. 236, 129
N. W. 436 (I91I) (promise to pay back the purchase price) ; Patrick v. Barker, 78
Neb. 823, 112 N. W. 358 (1907); Crook v. Scott, 65 App. Div. 139, 72 N. Y. Supp.
516 (190), aff'd, 174 N. Y. 52o, 66 N. E. iio6 (i9o3); Moorehouse v. Crangle, 36
Ohio St. 130 (188o) ; Clement v. Rowe, 33 S. D. 499, 146 N. W. 700 (914) ; Bain
v. Lovejoy, 234 S. W. io96 (Tex. 1921); Lingelbach v. Luckenbach, x68 Wis. 481,
,7o N. W. 711 (1919) (promise to buy the shares back at the same price).
A promise to indemnify one who gives over money to the promisor to invest is
not a guaranty if the investment does not consist of a loan to a third person. The
same is true if the promise is made to induce an investment to be made by the
plaintiff himself. See Partin v. Prince, 159 N. C. 553, 75 S. E. i080 (1912).
l0 Lerch v. Gallup, 67 Cal. 595, 8 Pac. 322 (1885) ; Stark v. Raney, 18 Cal. 622
(i86i); Tarr v. Northey, 17 Me. 113 (840); McCartney v. Shepard, 21 Mo. 573
(I855); Thompson v. Coleman, i South. 26 (N. J. i8i8); Mays v. Joseph, 34
Ohio St. 22 (1877).
11 Marcy v. Crawford, i6 Conn. 549 (I844) ; Wilson v. Smith, 73 Iowa 429,
35 N. W. 506 (1887); Goodspeed v. Fuller, 46 Me. 14i (858); Knight v. Sawin,
6 Me. 361 (383o); Wells v. Mann, 45 N. Y. 327 (187); Evans v. Mason, i Lea
26 (Tenn. 1878); Dorwin v. Smith, 35 Vt. 69 (1862); Adams v. Dansey, 6 Bing.
506 (i83o).
12 Marcy v. Crawford, 16 Conn. 549 (844) (entry to try title); Weld v.
Nichols, 17 Pick. 538 (Mass. 1836) (user of party wall); Allaire v. Ouland, 2
Johns. Cas. 52 (N. Y. i8oo) (entry).
"s Conkey v. Hopkins, 17 Johns. 113 (N. Y. i81g).
'4 In Mallet v. Bateman, L. R. i C. P. 163, 17, (1865), the court said: "That






that t t t t rti .12 r i t t r r
it t t t .13
i
t t t i it i t r it r f t ir rs
' t ti , if rf r -
r
. t r i -
l rant e" be
t i t li , lt it
nd
t
f r ' e t to and is within the statute.14
9 Kilbride v. oss, II3 Cal. 432, 45 Pac. 812 (1896); Merchant v. O'Rourke, III
1, . . 1 0); t . i , . , . . II (1915);
, . ); l . l r, . ,
19 I) ise i
, II . . ); r . tt, . i . , . . .
1), ' . . 0, . . II0 (1 ° ); r se . r gle,
. 8o); l t . , . . , . . (1914); ai
. , 10 ); . c , 1 i . ,
1 0 . . II ) ).
r i r
t t i t
i t
l i ti i l . ti . ri , . . , . . 1 ( 912).
10 Lerch v. allup, 67 Cal. 595, 8 Pac. 322 (1885); Stark v. Raney, 18 Cal. 622
1 1 ; II 1840); t y . , .
1 , I 16 . 1 18); s ,
77).
, 1 1 44) ,
1 1858);
1 0 ; . . . 871); . , I
, );
(1 0).
r . r f r , . 18 4)
) t ;
1 00) ).
18 . , II . . 1 9).
1 ll t . t , I , 1 65), hat
CONTRACTS OF INDEMNITY AND STATUTE OF FRAUDS 695
There is one type of case, however, that presents special diffi-
culties and that has resulted in much conflict of decision. This is
a promise to indemnify one who is a surety, a guarantor, or bail for
a third person. The following are illustrations: A says to S,
(i) "Indorse P's note to C as surety and I will indemnify you
(2) "Guarantee P's debt to C and I will save you harmless";
(3) "Lend P your credit in the purchase of goods from C and I
will see that you lose nothing." In cases like these the clear
weight of authority is that A's promise is not within the statute; 15
is, in substance, an engagement by which the buyers of the goods are not to be
exonerated, but the defendant is to indemnify the seller against their default.
That is clearly a contract within the Statute of Frauds." See also Bennighoff v.
Robbins, 54 Mont. 66, i66 Pac. 687 (1917).
15 Godden v. Pierson, 42 Ala. 370 (1868) (but see Posten v. Clem, infra note
16); Reed v. Holcomb, 31 Conn. 360 (1863); Smith v. Delaney, 64 Conn. 264, 29
Atl. 496 (2894); McCormick v. Boylan, 83 Conn. 686, 78 Ath. 335 (igo) (Com-
pare Clement's Appeal, 52 Conn. 464 (1885), a particularly bad decision, inade-
quately considered.); Clark v. Toney, 17 Ga. App. 803, 88 S. E. 69o (1916); Res-
seter v. Waterman, i51 Ill. i69, 37 N. E. 875 (x894) (stating that the principal
debtor owed the plaintiff no duty of indemnity); Stoltenberg v. Johnson, 163 Ill.
App. 422 (I911); Anderson v. Spence, 72 Ind. 325 (i88o); Mills v. Brown, 3[ Iowa
314 (i86o); Patton v. Mills, 21 Kan. 163 (1878); Dunn v. West, 5 B. Mon. 376 (Ky.
1845); Lucas v. Chamberlain, 8 B. Mon. 276 (Ky. 1848); George v. Hoskins, 17
Ky. L. R. 63, 30 S. W. 406 (1895); Dyer v. Staggs, 217 Ky. 683, 290 S. W.
494 (1927); Smith v. Sayward, 5 Me. 504 (1829); Alger v. Scovile, i Gray
391 (Mass. 1854); Aldrich v. Ames, 9 Gray 76 (Mass. 2857); Hawes v.
Murphy, 191 Mass. 469, 78 N. E. io9 (i9o6); Boyer v. Soules, 105 Mich.
32, 62 N. W. iooo (895); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Lawler, 64 Minn. i44, 66
N. W. 143 (1896); Esch v. White, 76 Minn. 220, 78 N. W. 114 (x899); Minick
v. Huff, 41 Neb. 516, 59 N. W. 795 (r894); Holmes v. Knights, ro N. H. 175 (1839);
Demeritt v. Bickford, 58 N. H. 523 (1879); Warren v. Abbett, 65 N. J. L. 99, 46
Atl. 575 (I9OO); Cortelyou v. Hoagland, 4o N. J. Eq. i (x885) (overruled in
Hartley v. Sandford, 66 N. J. L. 627, 5o Ath. 454 (900)); Chapin v. Merrill, 4
Wend. 657 (N. Y. 1830); Barry v. Ransom, 22 N. Y. 462 (1855); Sanders v. Gil-
lespie, 5g N. Y. 250 (1874) ; Tighe v. Morrison, 116 N. Y. 263, 22 N. E. 264 (1889)
(a good discussion); Jones v. Bacon, 245 N. Y. 446, 40 N. E. 216 (1895); Rose v.
Wollenberg, 31 Ore. 269, 44 Pac. 382 (1896) (cases well reviewed); Alphin v.
Lowman, 115 Va. 442, 79 S. E. 1029 (1913) (overruling Wolverton v. Davis, 85
Va. 64, 6 S. E. 619 (1888)); Faulkner v. Thomas, 48 W. Va. 148, 35 S. E. 915
(i9oo) semble; Shook v. Vanmater, 22 Wis. 532 (x868); Vogel v. Melms, 32 Wis.
306 (1872) ; Thomas v. Cook, 8 B. & C. 728 (1828) ; Reader v. Kingham, 23 C. B.
(N. S.) 344 (1862); Wildes v. Dudlow, L. R. 29 Eq. 298 (2874); In re Bolton,
8 T. L. R. 668 (2892); Guild & Co. v. Conrad, [1894] 2 Q. B. 885; Harburg
India Rubber Comb Co. v. Martin, [2902] 1 K. B. 778, semble.
In Hall v. Equitable Surety Co., 126 Ark. 535, 192 S. W. 32 (29x7), the court
held that a defendant who had promised to indemnify a surety was not himself a
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but a good many decisions have been contra,16 and some law
writers agree with them."
The majority decisions already cited are supported by many
cases holding that one who becomes a surety on the oral promise
of a co-surety to indemnify him can enforce that promise. 8 In
this case it is true that the promisor is usually bound to the credi-
surety and therefore was not discharged by the failure of the surety to sue his
principal at the defendant's request. This is a correct holding.
Of course a promise by the principal debtor himself to indemnify his surety
is not within the statute, for it is a promise of a performance that the law would
require of him even if he made no promise, and no third party is under obligation
to the promisee. See Robertson v. Wilhoite, 157 Ky. 58, 162 S. W. 563 (1914);
Kaigler v. Brannon, 137 Ga. 36, 72 S. E. 400 (911) (promise of principal to
indemnify his agent); Potter v. Brown, 35 Mich. 274 (1877).
16 Posten v. Clem, 2o1 Ala. 529, 78 So 883, i A. L. R. 38, (i918); May v.
Williams, 6i Miss. 125 (1883); Craft v. Lott, 87 Miss. 590, 40 So. 426 (19o6);
Bissig v. Britton, 59 Mo. 204 (1875) ; Hurt v. Ford, 142 Mo. 283, 44 S. W. 228,
41 L. R. A. 823 (1898); Hartley v. Sandford, 66 N. J. L. 627, go AtI. 454 (I9 o I ) ;
Draughan v. Bunting, 9 Ired. L. io (N. C. 1848); Easter v. White, 12 Ohio St. 2X9
(i86); Nugent v. Wolfe, IIi Pa. 471, 4 Atl. i5 (1886); Bayard v. Penna. Knitting
Mills, 137 AtI. 9io (Pa. 1927) ; Simpson v. Nance, i Spear 4 (S. C. 1842); Macey
v. Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch. 438 (1875).
17 WILSTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 482; ARNOLD, OUTLINE or SuRTasmp' AM)
GuARANTr (1927) §§ 65-74-
Holding the view supported herein, see SrRARNS, SuRTYsm (1922) § 33;
COSTIGAN, CASES ON CONTRACTS (1921) 1254, n. 18; BISHOP, CONTRACTS (2d ed.
1907) § 1265; ANSON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1924) § 97; 2 STREET, FOUNDATIONS
OF LEGAL LAriT'c" (I9o6) I86; Burdick, Suretyship and the Statute of Frauds.
(1920) 20 COL. L. Rv. 153; Steinmetz, Contracts of Guaranty and Indemnity and
Credit Insurance (191o) 44 Am:. L. REV. 736. And see BROWNE, STATrTE Or FRAUDS
(5th ed. 1895) § 162.
's Jones v. Shorter, x Ga. 294 (1846); Horn v. Bray, 51 Ind. 555 (1875)
(overruling Brush v. Carpenter, 6 Ind. 78 (1854)); Hoggatt v. Thomas, 3S La.
Ann. 298 (1883); Blake v. Cole, 22 Pick. 97 (Mass. 1839); Weeks v. Parsons, 176
Mass. 570, 58 N. E. 357 (igoo); Boyer v. Soules, 105 Mich. 31, 62 N. W. xooo
(1895); Noyes v. Ostrom, 113 Minn. ii, 129 N. W. 142 (igio); Apgar v. Hiler,
24 N. J. L. 812 (1854); Wilson v. Hendee, 74 N. J. L. 640, 66 Ati. 413 (,907))
Barry v. Ransom, 12 N. Y. 462 (1855) ; Ferrell v. Maxwell, 28 Ohio St. 383 (1876) ;
Rose v. Wollenberg, 31 Ore. 269, 44 Pac. 382 (1897) ; Mickley v. Stocksleger, io
Pa. Cty. Ct. 345 (189i); Anderson v. Peareson, 2 Bailey 107 (S. C. 1831); Sloan
v. Gibbes, 56 S. C. 480, 35 S. E. 408 (1899) (prior indorser was allowed to hold
subsequent indorser on parol promise that he would be co-surety); Clevenger v.
Commercial Bank, 183 S. W. 65 (Tex. I916); Alphin v. Lowman, 115 Va. 441, 79
S. E. X029 (1913) (overruling Wolverton v. Davis, 85 Va. 64, 6 S. E. 619
(1888)); Handsaker v. Pedersen, 71 Wash. 218, 128 Pac. 230 (1912); Thomas v.
Cook, 8 B. & C. 728 (1828). Contra: Posten v. Clem, 201 Ala. 529, 78 So. 883
(I918); Bissig v. Britton, .9 Mo. 204 (1875); Draughan v. Bunting, 9 Ired. L.
io (N. 4 . 1848).
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CONTRACTS OF INDEMNITY AND STATUTE OF FRAUDS 697
tor to pay the whole debt, although his duty to a co-surety is
merely to pay his pro rata share; but it is also true that the prom-
isee is a surety for another person who owes to such promisee the
duty of exoneration and indemnity. Direct support is also found
in most of the cases dealing with promises to indemnify bail.
These are discussed separately below.
An accommodation indorser has power to limit the extent of his
undertaking with respect to any prior indorser or any subsequent
one with notice. He can make himself a surety for other in-
dorsers instead of a co-surety with them, thus making it their duty
to indemnify him without any promise on their part.19 Where he
has such power, his signing in reliance on the other indorser's oral
promise to indemnify him should have the agreed effect, wholly
irrespective of the Statute of Frauds. Indeed it has been held
that if one surety signs at the mere request of another this makes
it the duty of that other to indemnify him.2" Such a holding is a
clear authority for the rule that an express promise to indemnify
is not within the statute.
In certain contracts of "reinsurance" the problem is also in-
volved, although not actually discussed. In the cases previously
cited herein, the surety (S) originally became such at the request
of the promisor (A), and in return for the promise of A to indem-
nify and save him harmless. It is not unusual, however, for a
surety company that has already executed its surety bond to "re-
insure" a part or all of its risk with another surety company.
The " reinsurance" contract, like other undertakings of surety
companies, is nearly always in writing, so that the question of the
Statute of Frauds seldom arises; but the promise of the reinsuring
surety made to the antecedent surety has been held not to be
within the statute.2' This is in spite of the fact that the promisee
is an ordinary surety for some other person as principal, with full
rights of exoneration and reimbursement against that person. It
seems quite clear that the " reinsurer " should not have the pro-
"9 Chapeze v. Young, 87 Ky. 476, 9 S. W. 399 (1888); Oldham v. Broom, 28
Ohio St. 41 (1875); Houck v. Graham, 123 Ind. 277, 24 N. E. 113 (i89o); Cray-
thorne v. Swinburne, 14 Ves. i6o (1807).
20 Turner v. Davies, 2 Esp. 479 (1796).
21 National Surety Co. v. Equitable Surety Co., 242 S. W. 1o9 (Mo. App.
1922).
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tection of the Statute of Frauds, although by a technical interpre-
tation of the statute his promise can be brought within it.22
A bail bondsman is a surety; and a promise to indemnify him
against loss by reason of his going bail is in almost all respects
like a promise to indemnify other kinds of sureties.2" Indeed,
there is no difference whatever in the case of a bail bondsman in
a civil case, although a bail bond in a civil case is not so common
as it once was in the days of imprisonment for debt. All the de-
cisions are to the effect that a promise to indemnify S if he will go
bail for P in a civil case brought against P by C is not within the
statute. This is true even though we assume that in such cases P
is bound to exonerate and to reimburse S, just as in other cases of
suretyship.
The same result is reached in the case of a bail bondsman in
criminal cases. A promise to indemnify the bondsman is not
within the statute. This may be supported, however, on a ground
not applicable to civil bail cases. It has been held, though not
universally, that if S bails out P in a criminal case, S has no right
that P shall exonerate or reimburse him in case of P's default in
appearance; this is on the ground that P is in S's custody and the
public welfare requires that S should have the utmost interest in
surrendering P back into custody of officers of the law for trial.
The policy of this rule may be regarded as doubtful, particularly
in cases where a cash deposit is accepted as the equivalent of a
personal bond of a surety. But in any jurisdiction holding that
the bail bondsman has no right against the person for whom he
22 Of course, both surety companies receive a beneficial premium as compen-
sation for the risk undertaken; but this has not yet been held to take their promises
out of the statute. See Commonwealth v. Hinson, 143 Ky. 428, 136 S. W. 912,
L. R. A. I917B 139 (i9i); Everley v. Equitable Surety Co., 19o Ind. 274, 130
N. E. 227 (1921) ; Stratton v. Hill, 134 Mass. 27 (1883) (for $5o paid, defendant
guaranteed title to a horse sold by another) ; Lang v. Henry, 54 N. H. 57 (1873).
It would not be surprising if the courts turn about and reverse the rule of these
cases.
23 As in other indemnity cases, a promise to indemnify the bondsman is re-
garded as a promise to a debtor, not to a creditor, and not within the statute.
Aldrich v. Ames, 9 Gray 76 (Mass. 1857); Keesling v. Frazier, zi 9 Ind. 185, 21
N. E. 552 (1889); Gonzalez v. Garcia, 179 S. W. 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915);
McCormick v. Boylan, 83 Conn. 686, 78 At. 335 (i9io) ; Anderson v. Spence, 72
Ind. 315 (i88o). See also Perley v. Spring, 12 Mass. 297 (i815). Contra: May v.
Williams, 61 Miss. 125 (1883).
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CONTRACTS OF INDEMNITY AND STATUTE OF FRAUDS 699
goes bail, it is certain that a promise to indemnify the bail bonds-
man is not within the statute. 4
In the case of a promise to indemnify a surety it is obvious that
the party who is promised indemnity, here called S, is himself a
promisor. At the request of A and for the benefit of P, he makes
a promise to C to answer for the debt or default of P. He is a
surety for P so far as concerns the Statute of Frauds. The diffi-
culty, with respect to the promise of A to indemnify S, is this: the
promisee S is both an obligor and an obligee. His position as an
obligor is the more obvious one; and it is this fact that may have
largely influenced the majority decisions. A's promise to indem-
nify S is clearly a promise made to a debtor or obligor to pay or
otherwise save him from having to perform a duty that he is un-
dertaking at A's request. If this were the whole story, the prob-
lem would be easy. But it is possible that S may be an obligee
also, as well as an obligor. One who is a surety for another has,
under ordinary circumstances, a right against the principal that
the latter shall exonerate him and save him utterly harmless. The
principal's duty of exoneration is regarded as existing from the
very moment that the surety becomes bound as such; 2 5 and when
the surety's duty to the creditor has matured and payment is due
he can get a decree against the principal ordering him to pay the
creditor and thus to save the surety from having to pay.26 Fur-
thermore, if the surety has to pay the creditor, or to render other
performance on the principal's account, the principal at once be-
comes the surety's debtor for the amount paid and the surety can
get judgment for full reimbursement. These facts show, assum-
ing that in the cases under discussion S is truly a surety for P,27
that A's promise to S is a promise to one who is also an obligee or
creditor; and hence in one aspect A's promise is a promise to a
24 Cripps v. Hartnoll, 4 Best & S. 414 (1863); Holmes v. Knights, io N. H.
175 (1839).
25 See Appleton v. Bascom, 3 Metc. 169 (Mass. 1841). This means merely that
the operative facts have nearly all occurred at that time. Before a legal sanction
is available to the surety, further time must elapse and the principal must default
in performance of his duty to the creditor.
26 See AmEs, CASES ON SURTYsHI (1901) 583 et seq.
27 There is some doubt whether S is in all respects a surety for P, as will be
indicated below. See infra, pp. 705-o6. S may not have any right against P. But
the matter will first be discussed on the assumption that S has such a right, an
assumption that is usually made in discussions of this problem.
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creditor (S) to answer for the default of his debtor (P), a -third
person. In this respect the promise of A appears to be within the
statute.
What is the solution of the difficulty? It is believed that mere
logic and mere verbal interpretation of the statute afford no cer-
tain solution. It must be solved chiefly by a consideration of the
policies involved. In considering these policies, the writer ranges
himself unhesitatingly with the majority decisions: A's promise
should be held not to be within the statute. In reaching this
result he may be somewhat influenced by the conclusion, based
upon a reading of many hundreds of cases, that the Statute of
Frauds should now be regarded as mainly an in terrorern statute
to cause important agreements to be reduced to writing and
should be allowed to operate as a technical defense in actual cases
as seldom as is consistent with uniformity and a reasonable degree
of certainty of law. In view of the fact that most of the courts
have already held that A's promise to indemnify S for becoming
surety for P is not within the statute, lawyers can predict with
reasonable certainty for their clients; and the present type of case
being sui generis, there is no harmful inconsistency in distinguish-
ing it from the ordinary cases of suretyship that fall within the
statute.
The first and most fundamental reason underlying the majority
decisions is that it is a horrid injustice to let the defendant escape
his duty to indemnify after inducing the plaintiff to undertake
the suretyship obligation for another person. If the courts have
seen reason in so many other classes of cases to narrow the opera-
tion of the statute in order to prevent contract breakers from es-
caping the just penalty, there is certainly no less reason in the pres-
ent case where the promisee has been induced by the promisor to
bind himself for another person in whose welfare he has no inter-
est and to do so on the sole credit of the promise of indemnity.
A second reason is that in these cases there is usually little dan-
ger of successful perjury and fraud. If the defendant truthfully
denies making the promise the circumstances will corroborate
him. The past relations of the promisee with the person for whom
he becomes surety can be proved and compared with those between
the promisor and such person. Usually it appears that the prom-
isee did not have a sufficient motive for becoming surety for the
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CONTRACTS OF INDEMNITY AND STATUTE OF FRAUDS 701
other person in the absence of indemnity promised, but that the
promisor did have such a motive. The " mischief" against which
the statute is supposed to be directed is less menacing in these cases
than in others to which the statute is applied.
A third reason is that the Statute of Frauds was drawn for the
protection of persons in the position of the plaintiff rather than
those in the position of the defendant. The plaintiff is the surety,
not the defendant. At the defendant's request the plaintiff has
undertaken to answer for the debt or default of another; and if it
happens that that other person is under a duty to exonerate and
indemnify the plaintiff, 8 this is a mere accidental accompaniment
of and is caused by the defendant's request and promise. The
defendant's promise did not grow out of and was not caused by
the undertaking of the other person to exonerate and indemnify
the plaintiff, making the defendant's promise a mere collateral ac-
companiment of that other's duty to exonerate and indemnify.
The plaintiff in signing as surety is not giving credit to another per-
son for whom the defendant is becoming a surety; instead, he is
becoming bound to a creditor of that other person and is doing
so in sole reliance on the defendant's promise to save him harm-
less from his undertaking. This is the aspect in which the trans-
action presents itself to both the plaintiff and the defendant; and
even if they know that the statute requires a surety's promise to
be in writing, it does not occur to them that the defendant is a
surety for anybody or that his promise needs to be in writing.
The court should, and generally does, look at an agreement with
the eyes of the contracting parties themselves. In the present
instance the parties do not ordinarily focus their minds on any
possible duty of the third person (P) to exonerate or indemnify
the promisee (S); nor do they regard the defendant's promise of
indemnity as one to answer for the possible default of P to S. In-
stead, the promisor is asking S to become an obligor or debtor to
C, and it is S's duty to C that both parties have in mind. A is
promising S to indemnify S with respect to his duty to C, not to
answer for P's default to S.29 As stated above, P may be under a
28 As appears below, this is not always the case; and if it is not, the only sup-
porting prop is knocked out from under the minority doctrine. See infra, pp. 705-
06.
29 Thus, in Tighe v. Morrison, x6 N. Y. 263, 268, 22 N. E. x64, i66 (i889),
the court said: "He did not promise to pay the plaintiff if Dowdall did not pay
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legal duty to exonerate S; but this duty is one of which the parties
are not even aware.
Of the right of reimbursement after payment, as opposed to
the right of exoneration before payment, the parties are much
more likely to be aware. But it is certain that the promise of in-
demnity to S should not be interpreted as a mere promise to an-
swer for P's default in reimbursing S - a mere promise to reim-
burse S if P does not do so after S has been compelled to
pay C.
A promise to indemnify and save harmless one who becomes a
surety for another is very clearly more than a mere promise to
reimburse the promisee if he has to pay. As the word is here used
by the parties, indemnity is not mere reimbursement; it is com-
plete exoneration. A promisee who is obliged to sacrifice his
property in order to raise money to discharge an obligation is not
saved "harmless" by a mere subsequent reimbursement of the
money that he has paid. As said by Lord Justice Lindley, in
Guild v. Conrad,"0 the promise of the defendant to the plaintiff
was that " if he would accept those batches of bills he, the defend-
ant, would take care that they should be met, and that he himself
would provide funds to meet them." If the defendant's promise
to S is a promise that S shall never have to pay C, then it is
clearly not a promise to answer for the default of P in failing to
reimburse S; and not being such a promise when it is made, it
does not become such a promise when it is broken. If S is com-
pelled to pay C, doubtless P will owe him a debt for money paid
him, but, in substance, to pay him if in consequence of Dowdall's failure to observe
the condition of the bond, plaintiff should have to respond to the People."
In Dunn v. West, 5 B. Mon. 376, 383 (Ky. 1845), the court said: "The plain-
tiff did not promise to pay West if his son did not pay him, but to pay him if in
consequence of his son's failure to pay the original debt to another, West should
have to pay that debt."
"Nor is it to answer for the default of Webster, [the principal] in not indem-
nifying the plaintiff. It has no reference to any duty on the part of Webster to
indemnify the plaintiff, in case he should make default. That duty the defendant
took upon himself." Holmes v. Knights, io N. H. 175, 18o (1839).
so [1894] 2 Q. B. 885, 896. The court further said: "In my opinion, there is
a plain distinction between a promise to pay the creditor if the principal debtor
makes default in payment, and a promise to keep a person who has entered, or is
about to enter, into a contract of liability indemnified against that liability inde-
pendently of the question whether a third person makes default or not."
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CONTRACTS OF INDEMNITY AND STATUTE OF FRAUDS 703
to P's use; but the defendant's promise to indemnify S and save
him harmless is not to answer for this future debt of P; it is to
prevent it from ever existing. The performance that the defend-
ant promises is not one that will discharge this future debt of P
to S; instead, it will entirely prevent its existence. A promise
by the defendant that P shall never owe S a money debt is not a
promise to pay a money debt or to answer for a default of P.
Nearly all of the cases holding the minority view are weakened
by various considerations. Some of them rest on the early cases
in England, New York, and Indiana that have been overruled.3
Others have themselves been overruled or have been distinguished
for reasons that show no fundamental difference. Still others
expressly indicate a desire to make a rigid application of the
statute that is out of harmony with the strong judicial current and
with the needs and social conditions of modern times.33
31 See Bissig v. Britton, 59 Mo. 204 (1875) (one of the better reasoned of the
minority cases); Hurt v. Ford, 142 Mo. 283, 44 S. W. 228 (1897) (bare statement
of the rule) ; Easter v. White, 12 Ohio St. 219 (1861).
32 The following cases have been overruled: Green v. Cresswell, io A. & E. 453
(1839) ; Kingsley v. Balcome, 4 Barb. 131 (N. Y. 1848) ; Brush v. Carpenter, 6 Ind.
78 (1854); Wolverton v. Davis, 85 Va. 64, 6 S. E. 619 (1888). Brand v. Whelan,
r8 fI1. App. 186 (1885), is not consistent with Resseter v. Waterman, Is Ill. 169,
37 N. E. 875 (I894).
The case of Easter v. White, 12 Ohio St. 219 (i86i), one of the best of the
minority cases, was distinguished in Ferrell v. Maxwell, 28 Ohio St. 383 (1876),
holding that a promise by one surety to indemnify his co-surety is not within the
statute. Hartley v. Sandford, 66 N. J. L. 627, So Atl. 454 (igoi), was distin-
guished the same way in Wilson v. Hendee, 74 N. J. L. 640, 66 Atl. 413 (1907).
Simpson v. Nance, i Spear 4 (S. C. 1842), cannot be reconciled in principle with
Sloan v. Gibbes, 56 S. C. 480, 35 S. E. 408 (i9oo), or with Anderson v. Peareson,
2 Bailey 207 (S. C. 1831). Nugent v. Wolfe, iii Pa. 471, 4 Atl. IS (1886), was
distinguished in Mickley v. Stocksleger, io Pa. Cty. Ct. 345 (1891), a co-surety
case, and in Elkin v. Timlin, 151 Pa. 491, 25 AtI. 139 (1892), without discrediting
it; in Nugent v. Wolfe, supra, the court cited five earlier cases, none of which was
clearly in point and two of which were practically overruled by a third.
In two states there have been changes in the wrong direction. Cortelyou v.
Hoagland, 40 N. 3. Eq. i (x885), was overruled in Hartley v. Sandford, 66 N. 3. L.
627, 50 AtI. 454 (i9oi), but the latter case was itself distinguished as indicated
above. Godden v. Pierson, 42 Ala. 370 (i868), was not followed in Posten v.
Clem, 2o Ala. 529, 78 So. 883 (i918), but it was not overruled; instead the court
attempted a distinction, an attempt that was entirely incorrect on the facts of the
earlier case. The later case followed a mere dictum in Brown v. Adams, i Stew.
Si (Ala. 1827).
33 Hartley v. Sandford, 66 N. 3. L. 627, 631, 50 Atl. 454 (i9o), classifies the
cases well, but rests upon a narrow interpretation of the statute, saying: "Others
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TRACTS TE S
' '











31 See Bissig v. Britton, 59 Mo. 204 (r875) (one of the better reasoned of the
i rit cases); rt . r , . , . . ( ) ( r st t ent
t le); t . it , i t. 61).
32 The following cases have been overruled: ree . r ss ll, 10 . .
( ) ; i l . I , r . . . ) ; . t r, .
~) l t . i , . , . . ). . ,
1 TIL . ( 5), i t i t t it t r . t r , 151 m. ,
. . 1894).
s f st r . it , i t. (18 1), f t t f t
i it , 6),
l i t t i t t i i i t i it i t
st t t . rtley . f r , . . . , 50 U. (1901), i ti -
i t i il . , . . . , tl. °7).
i . , I S. . 2), t il i i i l it
loan v. ibbes, . . , . . (1 00), r it rs . r s ,
il 1 (S. . ). t . l , III . , U. 15 86),
isti is i i l . t l r, 10 . t . t. ( 1), - r t
, 2),
it; i t . l , , t t it i li ,
l l i i t l .
t t t t i t i ti . t l .
l , . J. I 1 85), Ue J
, U. (1 01), t t l tt r s s its lf isti is i i t
. . i r , l . (1868), t f ll i t .
l , 01 l . , . (1918), t it t rr l ; i t t t
r t
rli r s . l t r f ll r i t i r . , I t .
51 l . ).
33 rtl . f r , . J. . , , U. 1 01), l i i t
, r tation , : ers
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
The minority decisions in the indemnity cases have in a few in-
stances been supported as follows: The words of the statute are
"promise to answer for the debt . . . of another person." They
do not say to whom that debt is owing. Now if A asks S to be-
come surety for P on a debt to C and promises to indemnify S, A
is clearly promising S to pay C. That is, person No. i is promis-
ing No. 2 to answer for the debt or default of No. 3 to No. 4.34
So far as the mere words of the statute are concerned they may
not illogically be regarded as including this case. It is very
doubtful, however, that there is much danger of perjury and fraud
in this sort of case; it is not "within the mischief" aimed at by
the statute. And at all events, the cases are overwhelming to the
effect that a promise is not within the statute unless it is to pay a
debt that some third person owes to the promisee, not a debt that
some third person owes to a fourth person; and the contrary con-
tention is hardly worth considering.
If the defendant's promise to indemnify S is made by him for
the reason that he was already bound to indemnify P as well, the
defendant requesting S to become surety for P as a part of
the process of performing his duty to P, the promise is not within
the statute. 5 The defendant is not a surety; instead, with respect
to P he is the principal obligor. It is equally certain, as has been
appear to have been induced by the injustice of a refusal to enforce a promise on
the strength of which the promisee incurred his liability, rather than by a ready
purpose to execute the will of the legislature." But did any legislature ever fore-
see these indemnity cases and express its "will" concerning them?
Macey v. Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch. 438 (1875), says that it is better " to construe
the statute rigidly" and " to adhere to the letter than to attempt to follow the
erring spirit "; but the case involved other matters, and the alleged promise was
found not to have been made. Those who have heard that "the letter killeth"
will hardly be moved by the court's argument.
In Simpson v. Nance, i Spear 4 (S. C. 1842), the point is assumed, the discus-
sion being on other matters. Clement's Appeal, 52 Conn. 464 (i885), is not rec-
oncilable with McCormick v. Boylan, 83 Conn. 686, 78 AUt. 335 (Igio), and it
also erroneously held that the promisor's attempt to carry out his oral promise
was in fraud of other creditors of the principal. In May v. Williams, 6z Miss. 125
(1883), it was said that "the statute ought not to be refined or frittered away."
34 Easter v. White, 12 Ohio St. 219 (i86i) (one of two alternative views);
Nugent v. Wolfe, iii Pa. 471, 4 AtI. i5 (i886).
35 Harrison v. Sawtel, io Johns. 242 (N. Y.. 1813). In Smith v. Sayward, 5
Me. 504 (1829), and Garner v. Hudgins, 46 Mo. 399 (870), the plaintiff became
surety for one who was defendant's agent and whom defendant was bound to
indemnif,.
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stated above, that the defendant's promise to indemnify S cannot
properly be held to be within the statute in any case where P is
not bound to exonerate or reimburse S. There are, indeed, some
decisions indicating that if S is induced to become surety for P in
reliance solely upon the defendant's promise of indemnity, the
law will create no right of indemnity in S against P.36 A surety's
right of indemnity against his principal is, in the absence of an
actual agreement between them, quasi-contractual (that is, non-
contractual) in character and is based on a theory of unjust en-
richment of P; and in some cases it has been held that justice does
not require one who has directly benefited by another's perform-
ance to reimburse that other if he undertook the performance
solely at the request of a third person and in reliance upon that
person's promise of compensation or indemnity.17  This is cer-
tainly a general rule in the law of quasi-contracts. There is no
quasi-contractual duty of paying for benefits that are received as
an incident of the performance of a contract between two other
persons. This seems to be applicable in the indemnity cases,
although no discussion of it has been found. If, without any
36 In Perley v. Spring, 12 Mass. 297 (1815), the plaintiff had become bail for
one Dearborn on the defendant's promise to indemnify and save him harmless,
Dearborn having deposited with the defendant sufficient property to indemnify
him. The court thought, perhaps rightly, that Dearborn owed no duty to the
plaintiff. If so, the defendant was dearly not promising to answer for any third
person's default.
In Holmes v. Knights, io N. H. 179, 178 (1839), the court said: "But the case
does not find that Webster requested the plaintiff to recognize for him, or that the
plaintiff acted upon any such request. From the nature of the case, Webster must
have assented that the plaintiff should become his surety; but mere assent, without
any request or promise, and when there was a request by a third party, and an
express promise by him to indemnify, is not sufficient to raise an implied promise."
In Tighe v. Morrison, ri6 N. Y. 263, 22 N. E. 164 (1889), the defendant, being
one of two executors, asked the plaintiff to sign their executors' bond and promised
to save the plaintiff harmless. The defendant argued that his promise was in part
to answer for the default of his co-executor, Dowdall; but the court said that the
plaintiff had not signed at Dowdall's request and that Dowdall owed the plaintiff
no duty of exoneration. See also Chapin v. Lapham, 20 Pick. 467 (Mass. 1838),
where the defendant promised to indemnify the plaintiff for becoming surety in
business for the infant son of the defendant. In Beaman v. Russell, 20 Vt. 205
(1848), it was said that in the absence of evidence the promisee will be presumed
to have no remedy against any third party.
37 Coleman v. United States, 152 U. S. 96 (3894) ; Hatfield Special School Dist.
v. Knight, 112 Ark. 83, 164 S. W. 1137 (1914); Cahill v. Hall, x61 Mass. 512, 37
N. E. 573 (1894).
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agreement with P, the promisee (S) becomes a surety for P at A's
request and in return for A's promise of indemnity, it may well be
that P owes to S no duty of exoneration or indemnity. If he does
not, there is no duty of a third person to S to which A's promise
can be collateral. But the conclusion that the promise of indem-
nity is not within the statute is not at all dependent upon the ab-
sence of a right of exoneration in the promisee against a third
person.
Where one person buys goods for the benefit of another, the
beneficiary cannot be made to pay for the value so received unless
before delivery to him he expressly or tacitly promised to pay.
Sole credit was given to the buyer, not to the beneficiary; and the
seller must be content with the obligation of the party for whose
promise he contracted, even though that obligation turns out to
be a broken reed. It has even been held that if the beneficiary
should, after delivery, expressly promise the seller to pay the price
or value of the goods consumed by him, he is promising to pay
the debt of another (the buyer) and his promise is within the
statute." If this is true of goods purchased, it is equally true
of services performed at the defendant's request but for the
benefit of another. If the promisee (S) signed as surety for P at
the defendant's request and on the "sole credit " of the defendant,
it seems doubtful that he should have any right against P. If he
has not, there is no longer even the most technical ground for say-
ing that the defendant's promise of indemnity is within the
statute.
If the promise that the defendant makes to S is, as indicated
above, to answer for and indemnify against the obligation of the
promisee (S) to his creditor C, it should be and generally is held
not to be within the statute. The parties may, however, have a
different intention and make that intention clear. Thus, if A
makes the following promise to S, it should be held to be within
the statute: "If you will become surety for P on his debt to C, I
assure you that P will reimburse you if you have to pay and I will
do so if he does not." " This expresses clearly an intention to
38 Hendricks v. Robinson, 56 Miss. 694 (1879).
89 This is on the assumption that P is bound to reimburse S. Otherwise, the
promise will not be within the statute, even though it is in terms conditional upon
non-payment by the third person. See Mease v. Wagner, i McCord 395 (S. C.
1821); Ledlow v. Becton, 36 Ala. 596 (i86o).
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answer for P's default to S. The promise is not a promise to
"save harmless" ; and it is a promise of indemnity only in the
sense of reimbursement." Doubtless the same result should be
reached if the defendant should promise S as follows: "Become
surety for P on his debt to C and I will guarantee that P will exon-
erate you." The conflict in the cases may be partly due to this
possibility of giving two different interpretations to a promise of
A to indemnify S: (i) it may be a promise that S will not have
to pay C without reference to any duty of P to exonerate or reim-
burse; (2) it may be a promise that if S pays C and is not reim-
bursed by P the promisor A will reimburse him. The minority
cases usually give the second interpretation, however far removed
it may have been from the expressed intention of the parties.4
Whether the Statute of Frauds does more harm than good is an
open question; but there is no doubt that the courts are taking all
cases out of its operation when they can give an apparently reason-
able ground for doing so. In the case of a promise to indemnify a
surety, there are grounds so reasonable, grounds that have ap-
pealed to so many courts and writers as sound, that there can be
little doubt that such a promise will continue to be held not within




40 In Green v. Cresswell, io A. & E. 453 (1839), the court said: "The promise
in effect is, 'If you will become bail for Hadley, and Hadley, by not paying or
appearing, forfeits his bail bond, I will save you harmless from all the consequences
of your becoming bail. If Hadley fails to do what is right towards you, I will do
it instead of him.'" In the two sentences quoted the learned court has stated two
different undertakings. The second sentence clearly states a mere promise to reim-
burse if Hadley does not do so; this promise is one of suretyship and is within the
statute. The first sentence, on the other hand, is stated in the form of an indem-
nity against an obligation undertaken by the promisee without any reference
whatever to any obligation on the part of Hadley. A promise in such a form
should be held not to be within the statute, and it is generally so held.
After the principal has defaulted and the surety has had judgment against him,
it is clear that the principal then owes a duty to the surety; and a promise by an-
other person thereafter to pay and indemnify the surety is a promise to answer
for the default of the principal to his surety. Miller v. Denny, 'ii Wash. 635,
197 Pac. 936 (1921).
41 The view that the promise to indemnify a bail bondsman is a promise not
to save the bondsman from having to pay the state but to answer for the principal's
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failure to reimburse the bondsman after the latter has paid the state is held in May
v. Williams, 6i Miss. 126 (1883). On such an interpretation, the promise is within
the statute if the "principal" is also bound to reimburse the promisee; but such
an interpretation of the ordinary promise to indemnify a surety is much too
narrow.
"Looked at as res nova, it seems indisputable that the defendant's promise
was within the statute; it was to respond to the plaintiff in case the defendant's
son should make default in the obligation which he would come under to the plain-
tiff as soon as the plaintiff became surety for him, an obligation either to pay the
debt for which the plaintiff was to be surety or to reimburse the plaintiff if he paid
it. In this statement of the nature of the promise there is, I think, every element
which seems necessary to bring a case within the purview of the statute." Hartley
v. Sandford, 66 N. J. L. 627, 629, 5o AtI. 454, 455, 55 L. R. A. 206, 207 (9o).
"The principal is always liable to remunerate his surety for all moneys paid
in his behalf, and if the promise be regarded as one to make good by repayment
any loss incurred as surety for Wisner and others, still it would only amount to
an undertaking that if Wisner and others should be in default in remunerating the
plaintiff as their surety, that the defendant would, in Wisner's and others' stead,
answer for their default by saving the plaintiff from such loss." Bissig v. Britton,
59 Mo. 204, 213 (1875).
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